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SAŽETAK: Proces stvaranja moderne hrvatske 
obavještajne zajednice u skladu s načelima 
demokratskog svijeta, bio je opterećen brojnim 
zahtjevnim izazovima zbog čega taj proces nije bio ni brz 
ni jednostavan. Međutim, usprkos činjenici da je 
Republika Hrvatska za vrijeme transformacije 
obavještajne zajednice iz totalitarnog sustava u 
demokratski sustav bila izložena vanjskoj i unutarnjoj 
agresiji, uspješno je prvo transformirala, a potom I 
reorganizirala svoj sigurnosni sustav. Iako je prošlo više 
od 20 godina od početka tog procesa, zbog politikantskih 
djelovanja, hrvatski sigurnosni sustav i dalje je 
povremeno opterećen štetnim utjecajem zaostalog 
totalitarnog mentaliteta.  
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ABSTRACT: The process of creating modern Croatian 
intelligence community in line with the democratic 
principles was burdened with many demanding 
challenges for which the process was neither quick nor 
easy. However, despite the fact that the Republic of 
Croatia during the transformation of the intelligence 
community from a totalitarian system to a democratic 
system was exposed to external and internal aggression, 
Croatia has successfully transformed it firstly, and then 
reorganized its security system. Although it has been 
over 20 years since the beginning of this process, due 
irresponsible political activities, Croatian security system 
is still, occasionally, burdened by harmful influence of 
remained totalitarian (communist) mentality. 
 
KEYWORDS: Intelligence community, Republic of 
Croatia, Homeland war, SFR Yugoslavia, OZN, UDB, 
SID, KOS, UB, JNA, UNS, HIS, SIS  
Introduction 
Society and existing paradigms can be changed in different 
ways. The extreme sides are or peaceful, or violent 
processes (including armed conflicts). The changes can be 
rapid, or gradual or slow, may be complete or partial. The 
process that will occur depends on many internal and 
external factors. It especially refers to the process of 
transformation of a one-party totalitarian security system in a 
democratic system that exists in modern parliamentary 
democracies. 
In those cases, Intelligence community is going through 
a complete changes: from the guardian of the Revolution, of 
the Communist Party rulers, from the sword and shield in the 
hands of the Party in the fight against political opponents, to 
a system that fight against all totalitarianism, defending 
human rights and freedoms, the system that cares about 
preserving the democratic order, which opposes the use of 
violence and illegal methods and means of actions. 
During the process of creation and of the modern 
Croatian state, security system was successfully 
transformed. Afterwards, few reorganization of the system 
was conducted, that did not achieve established goals. 
The authors describe conditions and the principles according 
to which intelligence community was firstly transformed, and 




































. then created to a modern Croatian intelligence community 
even during the war. 
Each process is, inevitably, loaded and faced with a 
number of challenges that need to be used as an experience 
to eliminate possible errors in future. The authors point out 
that the intelligence community is not and cannot be strictly 
defined system. It has to be (organizationally, with adequate 
human power, technologically, logistically) customizable for 
many existing, and future, challenges. 
 
Abut the time and context 
Organization of individual Intelligence Community (IC), with 
its activity in line with the established goals and tasks, is in 
direct relation to the prevailing social norms and ruling 
politics. Therefore, it represents one of the relevant 
testimonies of time when it was created, developed and 
operated. Complete analysis (objective, full, credible) of 
individual national IC, should include the narrow and wider 
context (aerial and temporal) when it is created and starts 
functioning, because various internal and external factors 
significantly influence IC development. 
Under the narrower context, we understand processes, 
traditions and relationships within the national corps to which 
an IC belongs. They influence development, organization 
and operations of observed IC. 
Under the wider context, we understand events and 
processes in the international community (immediate and 
wider) that either directly or indirectly, influence the observed 
IC. 
In the analysis of Croatian IC in the narrow context, it is 
necessary to consider the impact of the following processes 
and events: 
 The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) and the aggression of the 
Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Serbia against 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter 
B&H), 
 Yugoslav communist legacy (ideological, mental, 
social, human, organizational), 
 Completion of armed conflict and calming of the 
situation in South-East Europe (hereinafter SEE) 
and 
 The process of integration and admission of Croatia 
into the NATO and the EU. 
























































. In a wider context, it is necessary to consider the impact of 
the following processes and events: 
 The collapse of WP, fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
Iron Curtain, and the unification of Germany, 
 The disintegration of multinational states ruled by 
communist regimes such as USSR, Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia, and the emergence of 15 new 
states in Europe in the early 1990s, 
 The 1
st
 Gulf War, 
 Misunderstandings in the international community, 
primarily between the USA-EU-RF and within the 
EU, 
 Open (“unsolved”) internal and inter-state issues in 
SEE and 
 Relations of the United States with the countries 
with Islamic political provenance. 
In order to understand the process of creation and 
development of Croatian IC, it is necessary to describe the 
emergence and development of Yugoslavian IC, because of 
the communist legacy, and the violent break-up of 
Yugoslavia. 
Here we want, clearly and undoubtedly, to say that the 
modern Croatian IC is neither the successor of the 
communist IC from the time of the existence of Yugoslavia, 
nor any of its components. Also it should be noted that the 
intelligence and security services from the Yugoslavian IC 
had a direct impact on the process of creating and 
organizing of objectives and tasks of the of Croatian IC 
before, during and after the aggression on Croatia, as well 
as during the process of Croatian accession to the 
international organizations. Key opponent of Croatian IC in 
the process of defence and the creation of the Croatian state 
were the Yugoslavian (and Serbian) IC member services.  
1. Yugoslavian IC 
Yugoslavia was, from 1945, created as a multi-ethnic 
country with a one-party totalitarian political system in which 
all power had the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, later 
renamed the League of Communists (hereinafter Party). The 
absolute power in Yugoslavia had Josip Broz Tito 
(hereinafter Tito). The Constitution of Yugoslavia proclaimed 
him a lifelong President of Yugoslavia. In addition, he was 
the undisputed head of the Party. During the process of 
creation and existence of Yugoslavia, the most important 




































. role in shaping processes at all levels and areas of life had 
the Party and its loyal members that interpreted world and 
relationships in society according to the communist ideology. 
That means that the dependence on Yugoslavian IC of the 
Party was no exception. 
Development, methodology, organization and operations 
of IC of Yugoslavia, especially in today's Croatia, can be 
divided into several phases:  
 Creating a first precursor of Yugoslavian IC during 
World War II, from 1941-1944; 
 The first reorganization 1944 (creating the OZN) 
 The second reorganization in 1946 (creating the 
UDB) and 
 Transformation in 1966 - creating SDB and IC of 
Yugoslavia. 
1.1. Creating a first precursor of Yugoslavian IC during 
World War II, from 1941-1944 
The way in which Yugoslavian IC was created, organized, 
and how it worked, does not significantly differ from 
processes that created IC of other countries with one-party 
communist system on European soil (e.g. GDR). 
During the World War II, the Party developed and 
modelled, according to the Soviet NKVD, and with the help 
of Soviet advisers, its own intelligence and security system. 
During 1942 it took complete control and command of the 
anti-fascist uprising in the former Yugoslavia. With full 
integration in anti-fascist movement, primarily security and 
then intelligence part of the Party structure, the Party 
created the conditions that led to the elimination of anti-
fascist leaders who were not members of the Party. 
On 6
th
 of May 1942, VŠ NOP&DVJ
2
 issued the 
"Guidelines on the organization and functioning of 
intelligence service in the partisan and volunteer units in the 
field." On 27th of November 1942 VŠ NOV&POJ
3
 issued an 
"Intelligence service manual" that defined intelligence 
organization, its goals and objectives. Intelligence 
Department consisted of two parts: intelligence and 
counterintelligence. 
                     
2 Supreme Headquarter of National Liberation Movement and Volunteer 
Army of Yugoslavia. 
3 Supreme Headquarter of National Liberation Movement and Partisan 
Detachments of Yugoslavia. 
























































. 1.2. The first reorganization 1944 (creating the OZN) 
On 13th of May 1944, Tito signed an "Order on the 
establishment of the Department for people’s protection - 
OZN". Department became the organizational unit of the 
Ministry of Defence.  
OZN had five departments: 
1. Intelligence, 
2. Counter-intelligence activities in the liberated 
territory, 
3. Counter-intelligence activities in the army, 
4. Statistics, analytics and technology and 
5. Foreign intelligence services and foreign nationals in 
Yugoslavia (this department was established on 3rd 
March 1945) 
All heads of the OZN, in federal headquarter in Belgrade, 
and as well as in headquarters in republics and autonomous 
provinces were the Secretaries general of the central Party 
organizations. At lower levels of command in the OZN, were 
low-ranking party officials. For “ideological purity” and the 
control and supervision of the activities of the OZN, a special 
party cell operated inside the OZN. 
In this way, the OZN really became what creators 
wanted it to be, "political police" modelled according to the 
Soviet NKVD. 
On 15th of May 1944, the KNOJ
4 
was established as 
armed formations in the service of OZN that, as its executive 
organ "on the free territory" participated in numerous 
deportations, arrests and liquidations of "enemies of the 
people" at the end, and right after the end, of the 2nd WW. 
Statistical data shows that the OZN and KNOJ (and its 
successor), in the period from 1945 to 1951, arrested or 
killed about 150,000 persons.
5
  
1.3. The second reorganization in 1946 (creating the UDB) 
On 31
st
 of January 1946, new Yugoslavian constitution was 
adopted. After that, OZN was reorganized and became the 
UDB, precursor of Yugoslavian IC that existed at the time of 
Yugoslavian dissolution in 1990. 
                     
4 People's Defence Corps of Yugoslavia 
5 Hlaić, V.: Istorijska iskustva KPJ-SKH stečena u borbi protiv specijalnog 
rata i u izgrađivanju sistema zaštite. // Specijalni rat protiv SFRJ danas i 
mere suprotstavljanja / uredio Savo Martinović. Beograd: Sektor za IPD 
u CK SKJ, 1983., page 23  






































 of March 1946, OZN was disbanded. New 
intelligence and security services were established: 
 From the former third department, 
Counterintelligence Service of the JNA (known as 
KOS) was established; in later reorganization (14th 
of December 1955) it was renamed to Security 
Directorate (UB) of the Ministry of National Defence; 
 From the part of the first OZN department, 
Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
- SID (Service for Investigations and 
Documentation) was formed; 
 The remaining parts of reorganized OZN created a 
new service, the State Security Department (UDB), 
which was organizationally located in the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior. Republican OZN was 
reorganized according to the same principle. 
Remaining parts of the republic OZN 
organizationally transferred to the 
republican/provincial secretariat of the Interior. 




 session of CK SKJ, because of internal political 
conflict and clash of interests between leading persons of 
the State and the Party (Tito vs. Ranković) the 
transformation of the UDB was ordered.  Almost entire 
leadership, headed by A. Ranković (who at the time of 
dismissal and expulsion from the Party was vice president of 
Yugoslavia and Tito's deputy and a member of the highest 
party bodies) was released from all duties. 
The UDB changed its name to the State Security Service 
(SDB). Its organisational chart is visible at Figure 1. SDB 
was active at the federal level and in the federal units. In 
various areas, SDB had a different names, and thus 
abbreviations. An SDB in Croatia had an abbreviation SDS 
that is going to be used later in the text when we are going 
to talk about the SDB in Croatia. 
Although the SDB in the Republics were part of theirs 
ministries of the Interior, they were, for their work, under 
federal responsibility. On the level of the Republics, it was a 
professional, but primarily political responsibility. They did 
not need either a warrant or the approval from the Federal 
Security Service, if they wanted to operate within the 
national territory. If it was necessary to organize complex 
operational activities that would require activities that needs 
























































. to go beyond the borders of the base Republic, they needed 
authorizations from federal and territorially competent SDB. 
In the federal headquarters of SDB in Belgrade (Figure 
1.), but also in the Republican headquarters, an important 
role for the work of all SDB, had a "2nd Department". This 
department was responsible for repressive actions against 
political emigrants. Inside this Department, there was so-
called "special activities group” that "independently planned 
and executed various actions abroad, using its own agent 
network. They carried out psychological campaigns of 
intimidation, harassment, disinformation; they were creating 
different documents and materials as well as the forgery of 
certain numbers of some emigrant publications, planned and 
organized burglaries at headquarters émigré organizations 
for exemption documents, and organized, according to 
specific indications, physical elimination of individuals"
6.
 
At the federal level was an organizational unit, which 
dealt with cooperation with foreign ICs, because the 
cooperation with foreign ICs was allowed only to federal 
services. At the level of republics (Figure 2.), there was 
however, an organizational unit called "Independent 
Department for defence preparations of the country." The 
department created a network of associates in nearly the 
same manner and with the same objectives that had a "Stay-
behind network" (also known as "Gladio” network) in the 
Western countries, but based on the communist political 
foundations. 
 
                     
6 Despot, Z.: Feljton: tajna služba bivše SFRJ – 5. Dio: SDS i egzekucijama 
u borbi protiv emigracije, Večernji list, 28.1.2011., str 28. 






































Figure 1: Structure of the Federal SDB (part of Federal 
ministry of interior) 
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Figure 2: Structure of the SDB in SR of Croatia at the end of 
1989 (part of Ministry of interior at the level of Socialist 
Republic of Croatia) 
The structure and organization of the Yugoslavian IC, at the 
beginning of 1990, is visible at Figure 3. 
Yugoslavian IC, at the beginning of 1990, had two 
civilian (despite the fact that SDB in addition to the 
department's headquarters, had jurisdiction over the six 
Republics and two provincial SDB) and two military services 
with different responsibilities and obligations.  
Cooperation with foreign partners was allowed to almost 
all of them. It seems that coordination of those activities 
where organised at the political, not professional level, at the 
level of the federal ministers. 
Red dot (Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6) shows where Party 
organisations where acted as an internal Party control of the 
IC, and a society at all. Quite often heads of the Party cells 
where more powerful then appointed heads of the institution. 
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Figure 3: Organization of Yugoslavian IC in 1990 
Committee for GPD&SPS (presented as a red box in Figure 
3) was very important part of the IC system, and a 
communist society in general. Members of the Committee 
were: President of the Party (of its Central committee), 
President of the State Presidency, the President of 
Parliament, the President of the Council for the protection of 
the constitutional order, the Prime Minister, President of 
SUBNOR, the ministers of defence, foreign and interior 
ministers (appropriate at the national level). Similar 
Committees were active also in the level of republics and 
local organisations. Despite the fact that this was state body, 
due to the fact that its chairman was a president of the Party, 
it was treated ass a Party body. Everything what was 
important for the security of the communist society was 
























































. discussed in this body, from political, economical and 
security topics until personal appointments in the state 
institutions. Jurisdiction, differences, responsibilities and 
obligations of Yugoslavian IC member services are shown in 
Table 1. 
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7 Federal Service could, among other things, to act on the entire territory of 
Yugoslavia; it conducted co-ordination of activities of various 
republic/provincial agencies. 
8 Republican and provincial (Vojvodina and the Kosovo and Metohija) 
services could act solely and exclusively within their borders. The 
activities outside the borders of their republic/province were not allowed 
without the consent of the Federal service and the republic/province in 
which they it was intended to carry out its temporary actions. 
9 Republican/provincial SDB’s were allowed to act operationally, with the 
aim of collecting data of counter-intelligence nature, abroad only 
towards the citizens of their republic/province. In the event that they 
gathered data about citizens from other republic, they had to notify the 
Federal SDB (which already had to get all the relevant information) and 
the “home” SDB of that person. 
10 Cooperation with foreign partners was allowed only through the Foreign 
ministry activities. 
11 UB acted in accordance with the territorial organization of the JNA in the 
entire territory of the SFRY regardless of republican borders. 
12 It was allowed to have a cooperation with some foreign, military 
counterintelligence, partners.   
13 It was allowed to have a cooperation with some foreign, military 
intelligence, partners inside Yugoslavia and outside through the military 
attaché.   




































. 1.5. UB (Military Counterintelligence) 
At the end of the 2
nd
 WW, until 1990, UB went through 
numerous internal reorganizations caused by external and 
internal processes and events. At the end of this period 
(1989) UB was part of the Federal Ministry of Defense. Its 
structure is presented in Figure 4. During the whole period, 
UB was active in data collection by operational means. 
Since the JNA was a federal institution, UB acted in 
accordance with the territorial and braches organization of 
the JNA (Figure 7) in the entire territory of Yugoslavia. 
Members of the UB acted inside Territorial defense 
organization in republics (armed forces that were planned to 
be activated in crisis and/or a state of war). In this way, 
employees of UB had access to numerous civilian 
institutions. This access was abused by the members of UB 
after new JNA reorganization (Figure 7), when it became 
clear that the crisis in Yugoslavia is not going to be finished. 
UB recruited a number of persons for its agent network even 
among civilians. Although this was by that time law illegal, 
the leaders of UB, subsequently, justified these activities by 
the needs to preserve communist political system and the 
territorial unity of Yugoslavia at any cost.  
Members of UB created a several networks with different 
agents in the area of today's Croatia. Some of the members 
of those agent networks (at the territory of Socialist Republic 
of Croatia) were members of the republic’s Party bodies, 
ministry of Interior and even the SDS. Employees and 
agents of the UB, at the beginning of the Homeland war in 
Croatia (1990-1992) were responsible for carrying out 
numerous terrorist acts and sabotage (blasting the Jewish 
community and Jewish cemetery in Zagreb, the demolition of 
some of the monuments from the 2nd WW....)
14
.  
UB acted also against "enemy emigration" and foreign 
intelligence services in cooperation with SID. All members of 
the UB had to take care about their own ideological and 
political orientation, but also ideological and political 
orientation of other members of the JNA, because 
preservation of communism and one-party totalitarian 
system was one of the key tasks of any member of 
Yugoslavian IC. The party organization that acted within UB 
took care about “ideological purity” and that UB is “in the line 
with Party decisions”. Cooperation with foreign services was 
restricted to the cooperation with services from friendly and 
non-aligned countries. 
                     
14 Such as a groups called „Labrador“ and „Opera“. 
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Figure 4: Organization of UB 
1.6. VOS (Military Intelligence) 
Just like UB, also the VOS went through several internal 
reorganizations caused by external and internal processes 
and events. At the end of the observation period (1989) VOS 
was part of JNA HQ and had the structure presented in 
Figure 5. During the entire period, VOS has put the focus on 
operational data collection, and later on RI (Radio 
intelligence). 
Operational sources of VOS came from various sources: 
"Work of military attaches, operations of the intelligence 
centres in the country and abroad, units and institutions for 
electronic surveillance, inter-army cooperation, useful 
information, analysis, assessments and other materials of 
UB, SID, SDB and from other sources."
15 
  
Cooperation with other Yugoslavian IC member services 
at the federal level was based on signed agreements. There 
                     
15 Analitičko-informativna i izdavačka delatnost (1945-1985), author dr. 
Radomir Bogdanović, kapetan bojnog broda (pages 156-201) ; Razvoj 
oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945-1985: Vojnoobaveštajna služba, Beograd 
1990; page 157, 




































. was also territorial cooperation with each republic civil 
service SDB/SDS according to common objectives. It should 
be noted that the VOS developed a system that was 
supposed to be activated in the event of aggression against 
Yugoslavia through national territorial defense at the level of 
republics. It was the reason why, at the end of 1982, VOS 
intensified activities for organizing and activating several 
TIOO that operated in the area of individual republics. 
VOS GŠ JNA
1st division













Military Intelligence in VO, 
VPO and military units
Figure 5: Organization of VOS 
1.7. SID (foreign intelligence service) 
SID was acted as a foreign intelligence service of SFRJ. 
Priority tasks SID was gathering intelligence about "enemy 
emigration" abroad (especially about the Croats, Serbs and 
Kosovo Albanians). That was the reason for creating a 
several agent networks abroad. Members of SID were, quite 
often, members of SFRJ diplomatic and consular missions. 
According to the information that authors obtained during 
interviews with former employees of Yugoslavian IC, about 
60% of all intelligence about persons that were, by 
communist authorities, treated as a "dangerous emigrants", 
collected through the SID agent networks. After the 
























































. reorganization of Yugoslavian IC after 1966, that time 3rd 
Department was integrated in the 1st Department within 
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Figure 6: Organization of SID 
1.8. Party and State institutions 
Despite the fact that Yugoslavia was a multinational state 
with, publicly proclaimed, certain level of decentralization of 
state administration, the State, and as well as every social 
activity, was under the strict supervision of the Party 
authorities. Therefore, the authorities and cadres of the 
Party had the most important role in determining objectives 
and tasks, and the staff selection at all levels of decision-
making process in the Yugoslavian IC. 
During the presented period, (1941-1990), Yugoslavian 
IC had the following characteristics: 




































.  Strongly centralized system that was "Sword and 
Shield in the hands of the Party" in the fight against 
all, primarily ideological, enemy, 
 The brutality and repression as a continuous method 
and mode of action, against all persons and 
organizations that were, by the Party identified as 
ideological and political opponents, both at home 
and abroad and 
 Possession of police and judicial authorities in 
repressive actions. 
Although the names and organizational forms changed 
through the time, what never changed was complete IC’s 
dependence on decisions and orders that came from the 
Party. Nothing important could happen in the Yugoslav IC, 
as well as in other important segments of Government, 
against Party decisions. 
All IC member services were under control of internal 
Party cells that took care of ideological purity of the 
employees and keeping that IC is not going to be used 
against (especially) prominent Party members. 
Power and influence that Party organizations had in the 
JNA was also very important. Because of its influence and 
the large number of Party members, the JNA was known as 
the "seventh Yugoslavian Republic". There were 18 active 
JNA generals that were “elected” to be members of the 
Communist Party Central committee (CK SKJ) in 12th 
Congress of the Communist Party
16 
(held in 1982).  
Party membership was mandatory requirement for any 
serious personal progress, especially for the middle and 
senior positions in the IC and the state administration. Most 
of the heads of SDB regional centres, before appointed on 
that duty, were in a different Party positions (from 10 heads 
of SDB centres in Croatia at the end of 1989, 6 of them were 
appointed directly from local Party leading positions
17
).  
1.9. Party influence to the media and the judiciary system  
During the existence of Yugoslavia, the Party aimed to have 
the monopoly on: 
 Truth, 
 Information, 
 Events and 
                     
16 Grupa autora, 1986, page 388-389 
17 Despot, Z.: Feljton: Tajna služba bivše SFRJ – 2. Dio: Hrvatskim 
agentima KOS nije vjerovao i pratio ih je, Večernji list, 25.1.2011., str 
24. 
























































.  Interpretation of reality. 
IC together with the police, the army, the judiciary and the 
media system, had an active role in the protection of the 
Party monopole. During almost entire time of existence of 
Yugoslavia, Tito and the Party, remained harsh and negative 
attitude towards the freedom of the press: 
“Freedom of the press can not be unlimited and press 
should not be allowed to rage …… We have to be 
sharper to the press …… As soon as someone writes 
something in the press, it is sufficient material that he/she 
can be immediately arrested and immediately brought to 
justice …… Our press is wild. I think that press needs to 
be hit; it cannot go wild as it is now. We should take the 
necessary measures and to achieve such control that it 
can not be done any more."
18
 
Why is it important to mention this fact? Most of the 
journalists during communist regime protected and 
supported communism and communist ideology. Some of 
them because they were communists, some of them 
because they were forced (by some kind of blackmail) to 
work for IC member services. Those who where looking for, 
or “even worse”, tried to establish real democratic institutions 
and processes, were publicly blamed. There was a huge 
number of cases when the first sentences, against political 
opponents, were firstly accused in newspapers, and then at 
the communist court. 
Within each media, Party cells were quite active. Heads 
of party cells often had a function of "political commissars in 
media". Every media was under the supervision of IC 
("Editorial Boards and leading journalists were under human 




A significant number of journalists and editors of the 
media in the former Socialist Republic of Croatia (just like in 
other republics) were directly, and some indirectly, 
connected with different intelligence and security services, 
civilian and military
20
, on republic and federal level.  
                     
18 Some of the quotes of Josip Broz Tito published during 1969-1971 when 
he was speaking about freedom of the press (B. Novak, 2005, pages 
605, 670, 671, 699). The last sentence was practically an order given to 
the IC and Party organizations in media to take full control over the 
media. 
19 Novak, B., 2005., page 685. 
20 Connections of different journalists with military counterintelligence 
service where of particular interest for Croatian IC. 




































. There were two different types of journalist connections 
with IC member services: 
 As a classical agents and 
 As a members of the, already mentioned, 
communist “Stay behind network”
21
 (hereinafter 
SBN). They were trained for different activities in 
times of crisis and war. 
Those journalists that were classical IC agents were part of 
the operational repressive system. They promoted 
communist ideology in their public appearances. They sent 
reports to the civil and/or military intelligence and security 
services, about "subversive, anti-establishment, anti-
communist, anti-state” activities of their colleagues.  
The second group of agents, members of the SBN 
network were the persons that should start with their pro-
communist activities at a time when the area in that they 
operated is going to be directly affected by war activities or 
occupied by enemy forces. SBN members had different 
tasks: collecting and delivery of intelligence, maintaining 
communication with "free, unoccupied area", encouraging 
the population in the occupied territories to organize 
resistance to diversion, sabotage that should have 
undermined the opponent. Everything what the new Croatian 
government was faced with at the beginning of its mandate 
and during the first phase of the Homeland war (1990-1996). 
2. Time of change and democratization: 1990-2000 
After Tito's death (1980) the activity of the contemporary 
dissident and political emigration to overthrow the 
communist regime increased. Knowledge that was forbidden 
emerged and became part of the public knowledge. It was 
one of the main issues that endangered the communist 
system. The regime reacted with harsh repression, within 
and outside Yugoslavia, using civilian and military parts of 
the Yugoslavian IC. 
As a response to the expected situation, in 1985 the JNA 
carried out its own internal reorganization in line with the 
new doctrine as it was apparent, to be prepared for the use 
of the armed forces not only against the external, but also 
possibly, against internal threats to the survival of the 
communist Yugoslavia. 
                     
21 Those facts came to surface during authors conversations with several 
former high and middle level employees of Yugoslavian IC. 
























































. Military Counterintelligence Department (UB/KOS) had 
no problems with the limits of its operations as the civil 
services had. The military reorganization reduced the 
number of existing military districts (VO) to three: the first 
based in Belgrade, third based in Skopje, fifth based Zagreb 




Figure 7: Organization of Military (Army) Districts at 1985 
and comparison with borders of “Grater Serbia project”
22
 
By analyzing the layout of mentioned VO’s and VPO, it is 
easy to see the similarity with the situation on the territory of 
Croatia concerning the occupied areas in 1993. The area 
covered by the first and third VO, and the most of the VPO 
on the northern borders, almost completely coincides with 
the area that was occupied in the Homeland war, and is 
similar with the political program of the "Great Serbia". At the 
time of the adoption of these plans (1985), the authorities in 
Croatia and Slovenia were communists. Federal military 
                     
22 Admiral (ret.) Domazet-Lošo, D., How Aggression Against Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Was Prepared or the Transformation of the JNA 
into a Serbian Imperial Force;  http://www.nsf-
journal.hr/issues/v1_n1/fig2_domazet.htm 




































. leadership apparently was prepared to use military force in 
order to preserve the territorial integrity of the "Great Serbia 
project" and communism as the only ideology to implement 
such a program. 
After the crisis in the former Yugoslavia became more 
evident, due to strong internal pressures and awareness, 
that they could not deal with the upcoming Serbian 
aggressive attitudes, the Communist leadership in Croatia 
and Slovenia (early 1990), agreed to organise the first free 
and democratic multiparty elections. Newly created political 
parties won those elections. The process of taking over 
government institutions was essentially different in Croatia 
compared to the same process in Slovenia. While Slovenia, 
because of high ethnic homogeneity in the government and 
the society, passed the first period of transformation of 
government with no major obstacles and problems, the 
situation in Croatia was quite different. 
The new Croatian Government, after the elections in 
1990, confronted with serious problems: 
 Political, economic, social and security crisis was 
obvious, with chances of being even worse; 
 A new Government took power just “de iure”, but not 
“de facto”, containing numerous communist political 
and personal legacy in the state apparatus, 
 Defence system did not existed, 
 There was significant disproportion of ethnic 
composition in JNA and SDS in SR Croatia at that 
time (Table 2, and Table 3), and 
 There were a significant number of internal and 
external opponents of Croatian independence. 
Table 2: National structure of YPA officer corps in 1990 
Nationality % in 
census 
% in JNA difference 
Serbs 36,3 63,2 + 174 % 
Croats 19,8 12,6 - 64 % 
Montenegri
ns 
2,3 6,2 + 270 % 
























































. Slovenians 3,6 n.a. n.a. 
 7,4 2,8 - 38% 
 
Table 3: National structure of SDS employees in SR 
Croatia at the end of 1989 
Nationality  % in census % in SDS difference 
Croats  78 51 - 65 % 
Serbs  12 29 + 242 % 
Yugoslavs  2 16 + 800 % 
 
The JNA and the political leadership of Yugoslavia and 
Serbia, were aware of the upcoming crisis, and were ready 
to use violence for overthrowing the newly elected 
democratic governments in "Western Republics" (Slovenia 
and Croatia). Therefore, the new Croatian and Slovenian 
leadership decided to make political moves that tried to stop 
the development of the crisis and prevent violence. They 
offered political solution to reform Yugoslavia as a union of 
sovereign states or a peaceful dissolution. However, 
Yugoslavian and Serbian leaders did not accept those 
offers. Croatian leadership, decided also to implement a 
policy of reconciliation in Croatia and create the Croatian 
defence system to defend against expected aggression. 
In such conditions, it was decided to gradually, and as 
soon as the conditions allowed it, to completely transforms 
existing intelligence and security system
23
 according to the 
Western democracy values and principles. 
The main objective of the new intelligence and security 
system was to be an instrument of new independent and 
sovereign state, and successfully stop the aggression on 
Croatia.   
                     
23 It includes preventive, repression and judiciary system. 




































. 3. Croatian Intelligence Community (1990-2014) 
The process of establishing democratic IC in Croatia, in 
general, can be divided in four phases: 
1. Transformation from the communist to democratic 
IC: from 30th of May 1990 until 21st of May 1993; 
2. The First reorganisation: from 21st of May 1993 until 
21st of March 2002; 
3. The Second reorganisation: from 21st of March 
2002 until 30th of June 2006; 
4. The Third reorganisation: from 30th of June 2006 
until now. 
Some phases had their intermediate phases that we are 
going to especially indicate and explain. 
3.1. The wider context of the process of creating Croatian 
IC 
Numerous demanding and complex processes in the 
international community had an important influence on the 
events in the former Yugoslavia, and therefore in Croatia. A 
key event that influenced a wider context was the collapse of 
WP and the collapse of the USSR as its leader. The 
consequence of those collapses was a unification of the two 
German states, the reintegration of East Germany in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
At that time, for the international community, Yugoslavia 
had the role of “buffer zone”. Although by social order and 
political system Yugoslavia belonged to the communist 
totalitarian system, due to historical reasons (e.g. Tito-Stalin 
conflict in 1948) Yugoslavia was not a member of the WP, 
and it was not a member of Euro-Atlantic integration 
processes either. Yugoslavia was one of the leading 
members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Negative 
development of the crisis in Yugoslavia had happened at the 
same time with similar processes in WP member states, 
primarily the former Soviet Union.  
Although the break-up of the WP and fall of the 
communist totalitarian system marked the victory of 
democracy over totalitarianism, the international community 
was not ready to support the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
Especially not the violent break-up of Yugoslavia because 
international community did not want that similar, violent, 
scenario repeated itself in other East European communist 
countries, because of the possible catastrophic 
























































. consequences for the peace and stability in Europe and 
probably the whole World. 
The Republic of Croatia had several advocates in the 
international community. However, even Germany, just like 
some other states, changed there previous position about 
necessity to preserve the restructured Yugoslavia in the 
second third of 1991 after realizing that Croatia was a victim 
of aggression. At the end of 1991, majority of influential 
international community member states accepted Croatian 
and Slovenian requests for independence. 
Croatian political leadership, individually and with the 
help of allies, knew how to use a favourable moment in 
global international relations, and how to turn over previous 
opponents to support Croatian independence. 
It is not a secret that the relations between the United 
States and the EU, in resolving the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia, passed various stages. Only after the EU's 
efforts to calm the crisis proved unsuccessful, and when the 
crisis transformed to the asymmetric warfare
24
, the United 
States, pressed by their own public opinion, decided to 
involve actively trying to stop the war. 
The United States, at the transition time from the state of 
crisis to the state of war in the former Yugoslavia, were 
mostly completely focused on solving the crisis in the Gulf 
region as a result of Iraq's aggression on Kuwait. The U.S. 
and most of its allies in the region of the Near- and Middle-
East, focused on the situation in that area. That situation 
aggressor (JNA and Serbia and Montenegro) tried to use it 
and achieve a quick victory in their aggression against 
Slovenia and Croatia. The United States decided to use 
involvement in Yugoslavian crisis as an advantage for their 
own global interests, because of the fact that in B&H 
numerous Muslim population lives. In fact, protecting the 
Muslims in Bosnia, even when they were responsible for a 
number of negative effects and inflammation of internal 
conflicts in Bosnia, the United States tried to dismiss 
arguments that came from some states in “Muslim world” 
that the U.S. policy is anti-Muslim policy
25
.  
                     
24 JNA as an aggressor, unlike the Slovenian, Croatian and B&H Armed 
Forces, had significantly more kinetic weapons, significantly more 
people, much better organization, approach and control of domestic 
and, at some level foreign, media and logistics. We should not forget 
the fact that the aggressor had at its disposal other components of a 
state (judiciary, police, customs, and diplomacy). Slovenia and Croatia, 
at that time, had almost nothing of it. 
25 Clinton, B.: Ending the Bosnian war: The personal story of the President 
of the United States; page 9; in “Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton 
Presidency”,  1st of October 2013, 




































. 3.2. Transformation from communist to democratic IC: 
from 30th May 1990 until 21st of May 1993 
This period was very turbulent for Croatia, and thus for its 
IC. It is divided into several phases: 
 The existence of the Croatian security system in the 
legal framework of the existence of Yugoslavia, 
 Resisting the aggression, and 
 The existence of the Croatian security system in the 
legal framework of the internationally recognized 
state. 
A number of essential processes determined this period: 
 Trying to find a political solution for the crisis in the 
former Yugoslavia with the aim of peaceful 
dissolution; 
 Achieving international recognition of the Republic of 
Croatia; 
 The organization of an effective defence system to 
end the aggression on Croatia and B&H, and 
 Making the effective foundation for the democratic 
transformation of the IC according to democratic 
principles. 
After the elections in 1990, Croatian government offered an 
opportunity to all those who wanted to continue to work in 
the SDS
26
 according to the new, democratic principles. 
Some of the personnel left the SDS by their own will
27
. The 
SDS ceased to be an instrument of repression, as it was 
during the communist totalitarian system.  
The new government did not allow revenge as a form of 
behaviour in any segment. By the order of the President 
Tudjman, almost immediately after taking power, the SDS in 
Croatia stopped to treat religious communities in Croatia as 
“subversive and enemy organisations”. It is necessary to add 
that leaders of Croatian SDS, after the election results were 
published, suspended secretly positioned audio and video 




26 SDS was abbreviation for SDB in Croatia. That means that every time 
when we are going to use abbreviation SDS it will mean SDB that was 
in communist Croatia, and when we are mentioning SDB, it will mean 
Yugoslavian, and/or Serbian intelligence service. 
27 Some of them left the system because they supported Yugoslav and 
Greater Serbia political idea, some of them were retired but some of 
them stayed in the system according by instructions received from 
Yugoslavian and Serbian intelligence and security services. 
























































. surveillance equipment for tracking activities of Franjo 
Tuđman in his home. The surveillance system was in the 
apartment that was above the Tudjman’s home.
28
   
However, some persons that remained in the SDS, acted 
as a "fifth column". During time, Croatian IC successfully 
identified most of them. They were arrested or they left the 
Croatian territory before being arrested (such as some 
members of terrorist group called “Labrador”, ran by the 
Yugoslavian military counterintelligence service - UB). 
The transformation process to a new democratic IC 
during Croatian Homeland war, was based on new 
principles: 
 Loyalty to the new democratic Constitution, rule of 
law, patriotism, 
 Organization of IC (even during the immediate state 
of war and threat to the existence of the State) by 
the principles similar to IC in NATO member states 
(primarily US), European community (EC) and 
Israel, 
 A clear division of responsibilities between civilian 
and military intelligence and counterintelligence 
services, 
 The organization of an effective institutional system 
of control and supervision over the work of IC, 
 IC member agencies were no longer instruments of 
political violence. 
Croatian political leadership recommended that in newly 
created IC, only young persons should be employed, that do 
not have any communist past, that were in the Homeland 
war proven patriots, ready to learn and to share a knowledge 
and experience to future generations. Those persons were 
supposed to be pillars of the new democratic IC that would 
not have anything in common with any totalitarian legacy 
from the recent Croatian history. Transformation and 
reorganization of the existing security system in Croatia 
started during the Homeland war. In May and June 1991, 
basics for new IC, in accordance with the standards of 
Western democracies, were established.  
In late May 1991, the Office for the Protection of the 
Constitutional Order (UZUP) was established as a central 
                     
28 Under the name “Soča 1“ and “Soča 2“, military counterintelligence 
(KOS/UB) recruit the agent, neighbour of Franjo Tuđman. They 
installed, in the agent’s apartment, technical means for audio and video 
surveillance of Tudjman’s apartment. We do not know exactly when that 
had happened initially. After some time, the use of that means was 
transferred to communist civil service in Croatia – SDS (Despot, Z.: 
Feljton: Tajna služba bivše SFRJ, Večernji list) 




































. government body tasked with, among other things, 
coordination of IC. The UZUP was directly subordinate to the 
President of the Republic. Legal control was carried out by 
internal organizational units inside different agencies and by 
the activities of the UZUP. 
In June 1991, amendments to the Law of Internal Affairs 
were adopted
29
. Service for the Protection of the 
Constitutional Order (SZUP)
30
 was established as a civil 
intelligence and counterintelligence service. SZUP 
employees remained to have only a small part of powers 
that they had had before the elections in 1990. The SZUP 
primary task was protection of constitutional order, fight 
against violence, terrorism and organized crime (OK) and 
counterintelligence protection. Article 16 of the same Act, set 
out the procedure of supervision of the SZUP activities by 
the Parliamentary Commission for the control of legality of its 
work. Members of the Commission were appointed by the 
Parliament. The Commission should at least annually submit 
their report to the Parliament
31
. 
On 20th September 1991, Defence Law (adopted 28th 
June 1991) was published and therefore became a law.  
Security Intelligence Service (SIS) of the Ministry of 
Defence
32 
was officially established. The SIS had the same 
goals and objectives as well as the SZUP, but with the limits 
that their activities had to be carried out in the military 
domain. The Control of the legality of the SIS activities was 
exercised through, recently established, the UZUP. 
There were some suggestions that the SIS has to be 
organizational part of the armed forces (which were primarily 
advocated by some of the former JNA officers that came in 
the Croatian Army). However, Croatian leadership, in line 
with the practice in western democratic systems, decided 
that the SIS had to be an organizational part of the Ministry 
of Defence and Military Intelligence Directorate part of the 
Armed forces General Staff. 
Organization of Croatian IC in 1992 is shown in Figure 8. 
                     
29 It was a time when SFRJ still existed as a state. 
30 Narodne novine, broj 29/1991, 17.6.1991., Zakon o unutarnjim poslovima 
(pročišćeni tekst), članak 11; URL:http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/default.aspx 
31 Narodne novine, broj 29/1991, 17.6.1991., Zakon o unutarnjim poslovima 
(pročišćeni tekst), članak 16; URL:http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/default.aspx 
32 Narodne novine, broj 49/1991, 20.9.1991., Zakon o obrani, članak 151; 
URL:http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/default.aspx 


































































Figure 8: Organization of Croatian IC in 1992 
Part of the former SDS employees (from the Croatian 
Ministry of Interior) became, shortly after its founding, SIS 
members aiming to create an efficient military 
counterintelligence service. The reason why it had happened 
is, today, the object of many theories. The fact is that, Gojko 
Šušak, at that time Minister of Defence, was under the 
influence of media proclaimed as a leader of the right 
fraction within the ruling HDZ party, came from political 
emigration circles. The Minister accepted former SDS 
employees and gave them confidence at that, very sensitive 
time of the creation of the state and defence system. The 
reason for such behaviour of Defence Minister is very simple 
and can be found in the foundations of that time state policy: 
The need to strengthen the unity of the “Domestic” and 
“Emigrant” Croatians, to support policy of reconciliation 
embodied in previous enemies: political emigrants and their 
former "surveillance/prosecutors" from the SDS and 
Those persons, like former high-ranking employees of 
the SDS, had the necessary knowledge about the UB/KOS 
JNA, which, at that point, was the most serious and most 
dangerous opponent to the Croatian state and Croatian IC. 
UB/KOS had a very wide network of sources in all social 
spheres in Croatia (there was a calculation about the 
number of 300 reliable sources). Therefore, the process of 
creating, developing and strengthening the SIS in order to 




































. protect key national interests in the domain of defence, 
protection of military sensitive data, and specifically detect 
the opponent's agent network was a priority. 
Minister Šušak had a sense of a political reality and the 
necessity of creating a state based on a policy of 
reconciliation, not division. His work proved practicality and 
effectiveness of the idea of reconciliation of people of 
different political views, for the purposes of 
fulfilling/achieving key national interests: creation of the state 
and its defence. 
After the last peace agreement in Sarajevo (2nd of 
January 1992) signed between the Croatian Ministry of 
defence and JNA, came time to continue with process of 
transformation of IC to the modern democratic one.  
3.3. First reorganisation: from 21st of May 1993 until 21st 
of March 2002 
This period had several phases. Croatian IC retained “war 
structure”, objectives and tasks until the end of the process 
of peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube region in 
January 1998. After the reintegration, the process of 
changing IC from war- to peace-time, the adaptation of new 
goals and tasks started. In early 2000, parliamentary and 
presidential elections held. Previous opposition leaders won 
the elections. A new legal framework enacted in early 2002, 
two years after the administration takeover. However, the 
new government largely interpreted the existing legislation in 
accordance with their desires until the Parliament accepted 
new legal framework. 
Following processes determined time from 1992 until 
1998: 
 Trying to find a political solution in order to liberate 
occupied parts of Croatia or to use armed forces 
when political process proved not to be successful, 
 To end the war, and to stabilize situation in B&H, 
 The protection of members of the international 
forces deployed in the former Yugoslavia and 
 Ending the process of organizing a new Croatian IC 
modelled on the democratic system. 
By decree of the Croatian President, on 21st of March 1993, 
the UZUP was dissolved and the National Security Office 
(UNS) was established. The UNS was not the legal 
successor of the dissolved the UZUP.  
One of the primary reasons for establishing the UNS and 
new Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia was 
























































. the political necessity of coordination of operational activities 
and consistent intelligence reporting to the political 
leadership. Until 1993, quite often, the primary users of 
intelligence reports and analysis received conflicting reports 
about the same issues. 
The National Security Office Law
33
 (from the 14th of 
June 1995) organized the Croatian IC, almost fully 
compatible with similar systems in democratic countries, 
adjustable to Croatian needs. Organization of Croatian IC 




















Figure 9: Organisation of Croatian IC until 2002 
                     









































. 3.3.1. National Security Office (UNS) 
The UNS was the main state institution that brought into 
conformity, directed and oversaw the work of the IC member 
services and other institutions whose activities were 
connected with national security activities. The National 




 Coordinated the work of state ministries connected 
with national security topics, 
 Directed and oversaw the work of the intelligence 
and counter-intelligence services, 
 Directed, connected and analyzed intelligence data 
and reports necessary for the performance of the 
constitutional duties of the President of the Republic 
of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia and 
Provided counter-intelligence protection and security for the 
President of the Republic, Croatian State Parliament, the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia, the offices they use 
and foreign VIP guests. 
In order to perform the duties of the National Security 
Office as prescribed by the law, the following services were 
founded: 
 Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS), 
 Security Headquarters (SO) and 
 Control and Supervision Service (NS). 
In order to perform the technical and professional activities 
for all IC member agencies, the following services were 
formed under umbrella of the National Security Office: 
 Croatian National Sigint Service (NSEI - established 
in 1996) and 
 Intelligence Academy (ObAk
35
 - established in 
1998). 
Only HIS could practice operational, intelligence, activities. 
Therefore, other parts of UNS are presented with dash-line. 
                     
34 More about this topic can be found in article: Tuđman, M., The first five 
years of the Croatian Intelligence Service: 1993-1998;  National security 
and the future, Vol.1 No.2. June 2000.;  
URL:http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=2877
5 
35 Although the abbreviation for Intelligence Academy was OA, here we use 
the abbreviation ObAk because the new law from the 2002nd 
established Intelligence Agency, which also used abbreviation OA. 
Therefore, wanted to avoid mistake, Intelligence Academy abbreviation 
will be ObAk, and Intelligence Agency abbreviation will be OA. 
























































.  A director, appointed and relieved of duties by the 
President of the Republic, administered the Office. The 
President of the Republic appointed, by the recommendation 
of the Director of the UNS, various directors of the individual 
services of the UNS. The Director of the UNS was 
responsible to the President of the Republic for the work of 
the UNS and its individual services. 
National Security Office prepared regular reports to the 
President of the Republic and the Government about issues 
and activities of interest to the national security.  
Supervision over the legality of the work of the National 
Security Office was performed by, that time, the House of 
Representatives of the Croatian State Parliament through 
the Domestic Policy and National Security Committee. The 
National Security Office provided yearly reports on its work 
to the Committee and, on the request of the Committee, 
special reports on individual issues about different topics 
from national security domain. 
3.3.1.1. Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS) 
The Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS) was the central 
service of the National Security Office and the only external 
intelligence service of the Republic of Croatia that: 
 Collected intelligence of national interest outside 
Croatia, 
 Analyzed, combined, and distributed different 
intelligence reports to the President of the Republic, 
the director of the National Security Office, president 
of the Government as well as state and other 
ministries within the Government, 
 Coordinated activities of other Croatian intelligence 
and security services in activities of interest for 
national security and led, or monitored, the joint IC 
operations, 
 Cooperated with foreign intelligence services and 
 Was involved in counterintelligence protection of 
Croatian diplomatic missions abroad. 
Within the territory of the Republic of Croatia, HIS was 
allowed to operate only in collaboration with other, domestic, 
intelligence services. 
In addition to the aforementioned duties, the Croatian 
Intelligence Service performed other tasks in conformity with 
the law and other regulations. 
The director administered the work of the Croatian 
Intelligence Service. Director was responsible for its work 




































. and for fulfilling tasks that were received from the President 
of the Republic, the director of the National Security Office 
and the Joint National Security Committee. 
The director of the Croatian Intelligence Service was 
able to call and preside over the meetings of the 
Coordinating Committee of the Intelligence Community, 
organized the work of the intelligence and security services, 
and represented the Intelligence Community and the 
Croatian Intelligence Service in meetings with 
representatives of foreign intelligence services. 
3.3.1.2. Control and Supervision Service (NS) 
The Control and Supervision Service (NS) monitored the 
constitutionality and legality of the work of the IC member 
services. It was also responsible for following, collecting and 
analysing information about the work of the members of the 
IC as well as services and various sections of the National 
Security Office. Monitoring was conducted through direct 
contact, investigation or as the result of a requested special 
supervision. 
After the report of a suspected situation was finished, 
The Control and Supervision Service delivered it to the 
director of the National Security Office and the appropriate 
minister, to resolve problems or make progress in the work 
of the individual services and the IC.  
The NS was administered by a director. The employees 
of NS were delegated to work in NS as representatives of 
the various intelligence services of the Croatian IC. That 
means that NS conducted professional control and 
supervision of IC member services. 
It was not allowed to the members of the Control and 
Supervision Service to run any kind of agent network. 
3.3.1.3. Security Headquarters (SO) 
The Security Headquarters (SO) of the UNS was not really 
an intelligence service. It was a body that coordinated, 
supervised and directed the work of the IC member services 
that performed security tasks (counterintelligence and 
physical) and protection of VIP individuals and offices.  
The SO recommended goals, strategies and protection 
plans for the highest state officials of the Republic of Croatia, 
presidents of foreign states, governments, parliaments, 
delegations and individuals whose visit to Croatia were of a 
























































. great significance. It was also in charge of security and 
protection of the President of the Republic, Speaker of the 
Croatian State Parliament, Government of the Republic of 
Croatia and other VIP persons, as well as offices they used. 
The director of the SO presided over the Supreme 
Security Committee, whose members were: director of the 
SO, deputy director of the SO, assistant to the director of the 
Croatian Intelligence Service for counter-intelligence 
activities, the appropriate assistant of the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, the appropriate assistant of the Minister of Defence, 
the head adjutant of the President of the Republic, the 
commander of the First Honor Guard, and the director of 
State protocol. 
3.3.1.4. National Sigint Service (NSEI) 
The National Sigint Service (NSEI) was an expert agency of 
the National Security Office, which was functionally 
connected to the Central Sigint Services of the Directorate of 
Intelligence Affairs within the Croatian Army Headquarters 
(ObU GSOSRH). 
The NSEI coordinated, directed and oversaw electronic 
monitoring, of all kinds of signals outside the borders of the 
Republic of Croatia and as well as suspected terrorist 
communications and prohibited signals of an intelligence 
nature within the borders of the Republic of Croatia. 
NSEI director was responsible for the work of the NSEI 
and performance of the tasks received by the Joint National 
Security Committee (SONS) and the director of the UNS. 
3.3.1.5. Intelligence Academy (ObAk) 
The Intelligence Academy (ObAk) was an educational and 
research institute of the National Security Office that 
provided training and education of the cadres in order to 
meet the needs of the Croatian Intelligence Community. The 
Intelligence Academy organized basic and specialized 
education for members of the intelligence community; it also 
had its own publishing activities. 
3.3.2. Intelligence Community (IC) 
The Croatian Intelligence Community, at that time, was 
comprised of agencies that by special means and methods 
collected both within and outside the country, data and 




































. information of interest to national security. The Joint National 
Security Committee (SONS) and Intelligence Community 
Coordination Committee (KOOZ) determined goals and 
tasks of the Intelligence Community (IC).  
3.3.2.1. Joint National Security Committee (SONS) 
The Joint National Security Committee (SONS) was 
responsible for setting goals, and tasks of the intelligence 
community. It had an ability to approve annual plans of IC, 
and was able to direct and coordinate the work of the state 
ministries with the National Security Office on tasks related 
to the national security. The SONS determined policies and 
strategies related to protection of the domestic and foreign 
officials and prescribed measures and activities related to 
protection of national interests. 
The director of the National Security Office presided over 
meetings of SONS. Members of SONS were the deputy 
director of the National Security Office, the director of HIS 
and ministers of the state ministries (ministers of internal and 
foreign affairs, defence and finance) and responsible 
advisors from the Office of President of Croatia. SONS was 
responsible for defining objectives and tasks of the Croatian 
IC. 
3.3.2.2. Coordinating committee of the Intelligence 
Community (KOOZ) 
The Coordinating committee of the Intelligence Community 
(KOOZ) was responsible for the implementation of tasks 
received from SONS. KOOZ coordinated the joint operations 
of all agencies in the implementation of their appointed 
tasks. 
The director of HIS presided over the sessions of KOIC, 
whose members were:  
 Director and the Deputy director of HIS,  
 Assistant minister of Internal Affairs (director of the 
Service for the Protection of the Constitutional 
Order),  
 Assistant minister of defence for security,  
 Head of the Security Intelligence Service,  
 Head of the Directorate of Intelligence Affairs within 
the Croatian Army Headquarters and  
 Head of the Department of international military 
cooperation of the Ministry of Defence.  
























































. The director of HIS was able to, when it was necessary, 
invite representatives of the NSEI, the Intelligence Academy, 
financial police, Croatian customs, criminal police and 
military police to the sessions of KOOZ. 
According to the Handbook about the work of the 
Croatian Intelligence Community, the Coordinating 
Committee, among other things: 
 Prepared yearly plans and work programs of the 
Intelligence Community, 
 Approved and accepted joint operative activities, 
 Organized the work of the members of the IC, 
 Performed analyses and evaluations of the more 
important operative activities, 
 Brought methods of the agencies' activities into 
conformity with regulations, 
 Monitored the state of affairs in the various services 
and undertook steps to make improvements,  
 Suggested systems of training, procurement and 
preparation of members of the IC in operational-
technical sense and 
 Resolved conflicting interpretations in cases where 
jurisdiction of activities in various services 
overlapped or were unclear and other cases where 
conflicts existed. 
The Intelligence Community of the Republic of Croatia was 
responsible for obtaining data of significance for: 
 National security, and especially for conducting 
foreign and defence policies and ensuring economic 
well-being in accordance with laws and regulations, 
 Opposing terrorism and organized crime and 
 Protection of the highest state officials, diplomatic 
representatives in the Republic of Croatia, Croatian 
representatives outside Croatia as well as objects of 
state and national interest. 
The Intelligence Community was responsible for providing 
assessments and intelligence to the President of the 
Republic of Croatia, the president of the Government, and 
ministers of state ministries in order to enable them to, more 
effectively, protect national security. 
3.3.3. IC Member services  
The core of the Intelligence Community was comprised of 
four services that were allowed to perform intelligence 
activities: 
 Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS), 




































.  Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (SZUP), 
 Security Intelligence Service of the Ministry of 
Defence (SIS) and 
 Directorate of Intelligence Affairs within the Croatian 
Army Headquarters (ObU GSOSRH). 
The Department of International Military Cooperation of the 
Ministry of Defence was a member of the Intelligence 
Community, but it was not an intelligence agency in the true 
sense of the word, as it collected data through diplomatic 
contacts and official cooperation with other countries 
ministries of defence. 
Because the HIS is described in section 3.3.1.1., herein 
the remaining members of the Croatian IC will be described. 
3.3.3.1. Service for the Protection of the Constitutional 
Order (SZUP)  
The SZUP, in conformity with regulations on the Law on 
internal affairs, performed tasks related to the protection of 
the constitutional order, especially counter-intelligence tasks 
within the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia. The 
SZUP was responsible for preventing actions and intentions 
that could violently endanger or destroy the constitutional 
order of the country. The SZUP was also involved in 
antiterrorism and anti-organized crime issues within the 
territory of the Republic of Croatia. 
3.3.3.2. Security Intelligence Service (SIS) 
In conformity with the Law on defence, the SIS collected 
information involving counter-intelligence protection of the 
armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. The SIS had no 
authority over civilian citizens of the Republic of Croatia 
except in cases of wartime operations when, by order of the 
Minister of Defence, the activities could be expanded to 
civilians in areas of military activity. The SIS also performed 
counter-intelligence and security protection of military 
production regardless of the status of participants. 
























































. 3.3.3.3. The Directorate of Intelligence Affairs (ObU 
GSOSRH)  
The Directorate of Intelligence Affairs collected intelligence 
that could be used by the Croatian army. The Directorate 
was not permitted, in the performance of those tasks, to 
create an agent network or implement operations outside the 
Republic of Croatia, except in times of war. Outside Croatia, 
it was possible only to exchange intelligence data through 
official channels with military bodies with whom the Republic 
of Croatia cooperated. 
3.3.3.4. Department of International Military Cooperation.  
This Department was responsible for collecting data 
obtained only through official channels by military envoys of 
the Republic of Croatia outside Croatia from institutes by 
which they were accredited. Such reports were provided to 
the Minister of Defence and the Croatian Intelligence 
Service. Department was not allowed to act operationally 
either outside or within the Republic of Croatia. 
Table 4: Jurisdiction of the Croatian IC member services 





 Croatia Abroad Croatia Abroad Croatia 
HIS - x - - - x 
SZUP x - - - x - 
SIS x - - - - - 
ObU 
GSOSRH 
- x - - - - 
NSEI - - x x - x 
 




































. 3.3.4. IC control 
Domestic Policy and National Security Committee of the 
Croatian Parliament exercised parliamentary control over the 
legality of the activities of all IC member services, including 
the UNS.  
3.3.5. Homeland war experiences 
Such organization of Croatian IC arose modelled on 
experiences of existing IC, primarily EU and NATO member 
countries (USA) and Israel. As it can be seen, Croatia did 
not change only the organizational form of the communist 
IC. The member services lost considerable powers that 
communist intelligence community had. The changes were 
also at the level of symbols. The new symbol of Croatian 
intelligence community became an owl as a symbol of 
wisdom. The motto was "Sapere Aude" (Do not hesitate to 
use your brain). 
Although the 7th Department of Ministry of foreign affairs 
(MFA) was listed as a member service of IC (see Figure 4.), 
it should be said that it was an organizational entity of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was closely related to the 
HIS. This Department did not have any operational abilities 
and it was not allowed to run intelligence sources. The main 
responsibility of this department was technical and physical 
protection of the MFA and Croatian diplomatic missions 
abroad. 
The intelligence community had a very active and 
important role in planning, preparation and conducting 
military and police operations during 1994 and 1995 when 
conditions for peace enforcement in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were created, such as acceptance and signing 
of the Dayton Peace Accords. Although the Croatian armed 
forces were prepared and ready to liberate the occupied 
Croatian Danube region, Croatian political leadership, 
headed by President Tudjman, decided to give priority to the 
diplomatic actions in relation to the military operations. That 
decision is still subject of different interpretations. Because 
of the fact that Croatian intelligence community had actively 
helped operations in order to liberate the occupied parts of 
the country and to end the war in Bosnia, we think that it is 
necessary to present the underlying reasons for such 
decision: 
























































. The reintegration of the Croatian Danube region by use 
of military and police forces would lead to many casualties 
on both sides, killed, wounded and missing persons; 
With the expected powerful military activities, the 
population would certainly leave the areas that would be 
directly and indirectly exposed to war activities. Among 
these people, would be many persons of Serbian origin. 
That fact could lead to a reduction in the number of ethnic 
Serbs in the total number of Croatian population; it could be 
used by Croatian political opponents as an alleged indication 
of the anti-Serbian nature of government authorities. At the 
same time, withdrawing from the military operation, Croatian 
political leadership expressed the willingness to forgive 
(abolition) and for integration of citizens of different 
nationalities in the constitutional order of the Republic of 
Croatian. 
Knowing and accepting all the complexity of political 
relations in the international community, not denying the fact 
that in the area of the SEE many different national interests 
of some of the leading countries in the international 
community were in conflict, taking into account the fact that 
the Republic of Croatia was exposed to multiple standards 
since its creation, realizing that the process of international 
recognition was very difficult and full of obstacles, trying to 
avoid to complicate the position of those political forces in 
the international community who were inclined to support 
Croatian national interests, working on preventing the further 
divisions in the international community, Croatia abandoned 
military operation in favor of a diplomatic solution to integrate 
occupied Croatian Danube region. 
3.3.6. Transition to a peacetime period (1998-2002) 
After the Croatian vital national interests were fulfilled (in 
January 1998 Croatian Danube region, occupied in 1991 
was successfully reintegrated to Croatia), defence sector 
(military, police, IC) began the process of reorganizing and 
adapting to the new, peacetime activities according to the 
new tasks and duties that were received. The new tasks 
included strengthening cooperation with foreign, friendly and 
partner, intelligence and security services to stabilise the 
SEE, to protect civilian and military members of the 
international peacekeeping forces in the SEE and to 
integrate Croatian IC in international multilateral 
organizations. The IC was rejuvenated and ready to work in 
the new conditions and to face with new challenges. 




































. 3.3.6.1. Information and Media Operations 
The period from 1998 to 2002 (especially before the election 
in 2000) was time of the culmination of the IC politicization in 
the media. The politicization of the IC by creating 
constructed affairs and “Media Satanisation”
36
 of the IC as a 
whole, and its individual member services, aimed at possible 
acquisition of political points during the election campaign. It 
seriously undermined the integrity and operations of the IC, 
and created serious problems for its future success in 
fulfilling the national and international goals and tasks. 
Groundless reviews and defamations indicated the 
inadequacy of certain political elites to the expected 
challenges, their irresponsibility to the national security 
system and to the fundamental values necessary for 
democratic development of the country that they intended to 
operate. On the other hand, it created high level of 
uncertainty by international partners of targeted IC. That was 
the reason why the state could incur serious security, 
political and economic damage. The IC member services, in 
addition to their usual activities, in accordance with national 
interests, also served (during the Homeland War, 1991-
1996) as the key medium in the "shadow diplomacy" 
because the messages sent through this channel forwarded 
to the recipient systems could have a significant impact on 
decision-making persons. 
Croatia was, during the process of its formation, exposed 
to a variety of different Great Serbian, Yugoslav and 
international information strategies that had different political 
and ideological goals. There are numerous examples that 
testify that information attackers attempted to take control 
and management of the Croatian information space. Only at 
the end of the observed period (1999), information and 
media offensive operations were successfully implemented. 
The clearest recognition of such operations is described in a 
study written by Aaron Rhodes: 
“A Croatian informant said: “We have been used to 
achieve political objectives [the overthrow of the HDZ 
party], and then abandoned. Assistance was not to 
promote democracy and values.”
37
 
                     
36 The goal of “Media Satanization” is to compare targeted persons with the 
Satan/Devil. 
37 Rhodes, Aaron: Ten years of Media Support to the Balkans, An 
Assessmet; Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – Media Task 
Force of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, June 2007; page 26, 
























































. In the middle of this period, in Croatia were held regular 
parliamentary elections (3rd of January 2000) as well as, 
because of the death of President Tudjman, early 
presidential elections (25th of January 2000). The victories 
in the both elections were reached by the unified opposition 
that started a number of changes in the society and the 
state. One of these changes affected the Croatian IC. 
New leading figures of all of the IC member services 
were appointed. However, time from the takeover of power 
until the adoption of new laws (21st March 2002) was 
marked by scandals and conflicts of political parties that 
were part of the ruling coalition, among other things, in 
connection with the IC member services. The new 
government dismissed many of IC's current employees (all 
of them that were fired, sued the state, and they all got a 
positive for them, final judgment before the Croatian courts 
for illegal dismissal). The new government ordered the 
police intervention in the Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS), 
an action unprecedented in democratic countries. This 
example was only a confirmation of the existence of serious 
conflicts within the ruling coalition about key national 
interests. 
In fact, little more than three months after the new 
director of HIS (distinguished university professor, who was 
publicly known by his political preferences to the ruling 
coalition) was appointed, the top state officials (the President 
and the Prime Minister) decided that it is necessary to 
replace him. The removal was performed by members of the 
Special police of the Ministry of Interior that armed with full 
equipment and weapons, occupied HIS offices, and 
conducted police control and supervision of the HIS staff. As 
a director of Foreign Intelligence Service (what HIS was), a 
former police inspector who wanted to convert Intelligence 
Service into a police-investigative agency, was appointed. 
This move only showed a lack of vision and strategy for 
using the IC as one of the key segments in the process of 
protection and development of the countries key national 
interests. Once the intelligence community becomes the 
object of conflicts between political parties that are part of 
ruling coalition, when the intelligence agency is criminalized 
by the invasion of special police, its future becomes very 
uncertain, its success in the protection of national and 
international interests becomes very questionable. Using the 
                                                    
http://www.medienhilfe.ch/fileadmin/media/images/dossier/mediasuppor
t_Balkan.pdf 




































. IC according to only party criteria, and not according to the 
national interests, does not achieve long-term benefits. 
Short-term benefits for the ruling coalition are several times 
lower than negative consequences that such politicization 
can caused. 
3.3.6.2. Journalists and “Journalists” 
There are numerous examples from the history of the 
development of Croatian intelligence community in which 
individual journalists "discovered" state secrets and 
published classified documents. None of these disclosures 
was a result of coincidence or investigative journalist’s 
activities. They were a part of the planned process of 
information and media operations with different objectives, 
as defined by David Alberts
38
, the struggle for achieving 
information superiority in information and cognitive domain. 
Unsatisfied persons
39
 from former communist and that time 
present the governing administrations who fought against 
the creation of a new democratic IC, used some of the 
journalists, especially those who were agents of Yugoslavian 
IC
40
, for there own personal purposes.  
It was very a simple reason: they did not want to lose 
their “privileges” to be the only service responsible for 
collecting, interpreting, and delivering intelligence to the 
customers. They used those journalists as a communication 
channel for the publication of false and tendentiously 
interpreted disinformation trying to impose a certain public 
perception. An analysis of the writing of the media during 
1995-1999 showed that the HIS and SIS were blamed, 
tendentiously, in specific media that belonged to the same 
owner. The actual problems existed in the civil service, the 
SZUP, in which certain roles still had members of the old 
                     
38 Alberts D.S., Gartska, J.J., Hayes, R.E.: Understanding Information Age 
Warfare, CCRP, 2001; http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_UIAW.pdf, 
approach 10 May 2013 
39 Those who were unsatisfied with the system were not the only sources of 
(mis)information. In that group of informants should also be included 
some foreign diplomats and members of foreign intelligence services 
who acted in accordance with their own national interests and even 
some Croatian politicians who, unaccustomed to the state-responsible 
behaviour consciously placed (mis)information in order to mislead the 
public and tendentious/distorted interpretations of some events. 
40 We should not exclude the possibility that some journalists in Croatia 
remained linked to the masterminds of former Yugoslavia, later Serbia's 
intelligence agencies for which they deliberately placed misinformation 
in many Croatian and international media coverage. More about that in 
the book: „Specijalni rat 3“, G. Akrap 
























































. Yugoslavian IC. The power of media is similar to the illusion 
of power that provides fire: a good servant, but a bad 
master.  
Media exposure of successful intelligence operations of 
Croatian IC, self-managed and those managed with 
international partners, had a significantly negative effect to 
the security of IC personnel, as well as on the effectiveness 
and credibility of the IC in general. A well-known example is 
the publication, by then the most heavily guarded state 
secret, that Croatian IC could surveillance phone 
communication used by Slobodan Milosevic, the president of 
Serbia, for years. The newly elected (in 2000) Minister of 
Defence, Jozo Radoš released, to the media house that 
stood out in the media attacks on the late President 
Tudjman, transcripts of Milosevic conversations that were 
secretly recorded by Croatian IC. This was fully, against any 
Croatian law, act of the minister Radoš. 
Even the media that was usually reluctant to the HDZ 
and President Tudjman demanded Radoš resignation
41
. The 
publication of these documents had a very bad resonance in 
the international intelligence community since the Croatian 
side suddenly became an unreliable partner for any serious 
and responsible work, especially in the implementation of 
complex activities with one or more partners and friendly 
services. It is not necessary to mention that, immediately 
after those documents/transcripts were published, Serbian 
side found and disabled further surveillance. 
In the area of international cooperation, it is necessary to 
know that at least three different levels of possible 
cooperation exist:  
 Partners, 
 Friends and  
 Allies. 
Any violation of the written and unwritten rules of intelligence 
activities, brings into question the responsibility to set tasks, 
and seriously undermines the confidence of 
partner/friend/allies agencies. A special problem for the 
credibility of the selected IC represents the behaviour of 
primary users when they use IC reports with the aim of 
acquiring its own personal/political interests at the expense of 
national interests. In such circumstances, such an IC, or a 
particular member service, cease to be serious by its friends 
                     
41 Defense Minister reveals the most sensitive confidential military 
documents: Rados Must Resign Due to the Milosevic Affair; 
URL:http://www.nacional.hr/en/clanak/18022/rados-must-resign-due-to-
the-milosevic-affair, author Euard Šoštarić, 5th of February 2002, 
access 25th of April 2014. 




































. and allies. Cooperation with such systems, very quickly, is 
reduced to the level of protocol. 
3.4. Second reorganisation: from 21st of March 2002 until 
30th of June 2006 
After the elections held in early 2000, political situation was 
changed. The new administration decided to, almost fully, 
ignore the existing legislation about the structure and 
organization of Croatian IC. It was therefore a matter of days 
when the multi-party coalition was going to reach an 
agreement with that time President of the Republic of 
Croatia, about the new legal framework of IC. 
More than two years after the change in power, on 21st 
of March 2002 the Law on Security Services of the Republic 
Croatia (http://www.poslovniforum.hr/zakoni/zss010.asp) 
was adopted in the Parliament. That meant the 
reorganization of the IC. The HIS was renamed to 
Intelligence Agency (OA), the SZUP was renamed to 
Counter-intelligence Agency (POA), and the SIS was 
renamed to Military security agency (VSA) while the UNS, as 
a state institution, ceased to exist. The directors of those 
services were appointed after political negotiations within the 
ruling coalition, as well as with the President. After a while, 
instead of the UNS, Office of the National Security Council 
(UVNS) was established. The UVNS had partially changed 
responsibilities and powers. There was a change in the 
duties, tasks, and responsibilities in certain departments. 
Intelligence Academy, which was supposed to be the core of 
the future professional education, professional and politically 
independent staff, was also abolished. 
The negative consequences of such a law came out very 
quickly: coordination of activities ceased to exist, a clear 
division of responsibilities of certain services was missing, it 
led to overlapping of jurisdiction and to serious 
misunderstandings (some of which have erupted in the 
public) and to conflicts between directors of the individual 
services. 
Neither in the field of international relations was 
coordination of activities, although the new law allowed to 
the OA and POA opportunity to maintain cooperation with 
foreign partners. 
Even some politicians suggested that the work of the 
intelligence community needed to be supervised and 
controlled by members of some NGO’s, e.g. civil society 
organizations despite the fact that they did not have the 
























































. necessary knowledge and, especially, necessary security 
clearance. Such ideas were not accepted due to the reaction 
of the international expert community that warned the 
contemporary Croatian authorities that there existed some 
procedures, including the security certificate that had to be 
respected if Croatia wanted to become a responsible 
member of the international community. 
The new law did not improve the system of national 
security. It opened a number of problems that had to be 
resolved by the new law. 
3.5. Third reorganisation: from 30th of June 2006 until 
now (2014)  
At the end of 2003, the parliamentary elections were held. 
The HDZ, but now with new leadership, won. The HDZ 
launched a process of change in the intelligence community 
that led to the reorganization and creation of the new IC. On 
30th June 2006, the new Law on security-intelligence 
system of Croatia (http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/127655.html) was adopted. This 
law combined external (OA) and internal (POA) intelligence 
and security agencies into a new, unified agency, Security 
Intelligence Agency (SOA). In military domain, Military 
Security Intelligence Agency (VSOA) was established 
(Figure 10). 
Although the system was reorganized to strengthen its 
effectiveness, subsequent events showed that those who 
criticized the changes from the 2002, especially changes in 
the 2006, were right. The key objections to the 
reorganization of the 2006 were focused on the fact, that 
there was no definition of the intelligence community; there 
was no, or it was poor, coordination of the various parts of 
the intelligence-security system as it lacked a clear and an 
unambiguous definition of objectives and tasks on the basis 
of which it should have developed annual work plans; there 
was no real effective system of supervision and control over 
the legality of action; too much power (information, 
personnel, material) is concentrated in the hands of one 
person (the director of the organization). 
After 24 years of Croatian independence, it happened 
(September 2013) for the first time that heads of the IC 
member service were accused for abusing the power. In 
April 2014, they were (two generals; the Director and the 




































. Deputy Director of VSOA) officially charged by the USKOK
42
 
for misusing special funds. 
According to this Law, Croatia has two intelligence and 
security agencies. Their directors are, jointly, appointed to 
the duty by the State President and the Prime Minister. 
National Security Council (VNS) members are: the 
President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, a member of 
the Government responsible for national security, the 
minister responsible for defence affairs, the minister 
responsible for internal affairs, minister responsible for 
foreign affairs, the minister responsible for justice, Advisor to 
the President for national security, Chief of the Croatian 
Armed Forces, director of SOA, director of VSOA and head 
of the UVNS. Council, among other things, discusses issues 
in the domain of national security and establishes guidelines 
for annual plans of intelligence and security agencies. 
Members of a Council for coordination of security and 
intelligence agencies are: member of the Government 
responsible for national security as president of the Council, 
Advisor to the President for national security as vice 
president, directors of security and intelligence agencies and 
head of UVNS. Council, among other things, implements 
decisions of the President of the Republic and the 
Government related to the activities of IC, operationally 
coordinates the work of security and intelligence agencies 
and other bodies of the security and intelligence system, and 
gives an opinion about the cooperation with the 
corresponding services of other countries. 
                     
42 Generali Grdić i Preost optuženi za pronevjeru 5 mil. Kn; 
Večernji list; datum objave: 26.9.2013. u 14.55 sati; autor 
Vanja Moskaljov; http://www.vecernji.hr/crna-
kronika/generali-grdic-i-preost-optuzeni-za-pronevjeru-5-mil-
kn-619223, pristup: 5.6.2014 
























































. President of 
Croatia
 






Ministres and other 
Government bodies
 
Office of the National 
Security Council
 
Council for Coordination of Security 
and Intelligence Agencies
 
Securty and Intelligence 
Agency (SOA)
 


















Office of the National Security Council (UVNS) performs 
professional and administrative affairs for the National 
Security Council and the Council for coordination of security 
intelligence agencies, helping the National Security Council 
to analyse the reports provided by the security and 
intelligence agencies, assesses whether the goals of the of 
security intelligence agencies are according to the plans, 
assess implementation of the decisions of the President of 
the Republic and the Government in directing the work of 
security and intelligence agencies and helps to the President 
                     
43 Croatian Security and Intelligence System – Diagram; 
URL:https://www.soa.hr/en/soa/diagram/  pristup: 4.6.2014. 




































. of the Republic and the Government to provide supervision 
over the work of security and intelligence agencies. 
This law established the Operational and Technical 
Center for Surveillance of Telecommunications (OTC) with 
the task of collecting data through secret surveillance of 
telecommunications for the IC member services, the police, 
and the State Attorney's Office. 
The Law also founded the Information Systems Security 
Bureau (ZSIS) as a central government body to perform, in 
the technical area, norms and procedures of information 
security to the state bodies of the Republic of Croatia. 
The law allows supervision and control of the IC member 
activities that can be performed by the employees of UVNS, 
through the appropriate parliamentary committee of Croatian 
Parliament and civic society through the Council for Civilian 
Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies (members of 
this Council are appointed by the Croatian Parliament). 




                     
44 Oversight of SOA Activity; URL:https://www.soa.hr/en/soa/oversight/   
access 4th of June 2014 
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Figures 11: Organization of supervision of the SOA and the 
VSOA work by the law from 2006 
CONCLUSION 
The history of the creation of Croatian IC showed that the 
first 10 years of its creation were a process that continuously 
created and developed a system of national security in 
accordance with the Western democratic principles. During 
this period, Croatian IC had clearly defined goals and 
objectives, and had a certain level of continuity of personnel 
and its activities. The analysis shows that Croatia has 
successfully, in a situation when it was faced with 
aggression with an uncertain outcome, successfully 
achieved the vital national interests (defence and creation of 
an internationally recognized state) including the process of 
communist IC transformation into a democratic IC. Even 




































. during the time of war, it became a respectable partner of 
many foreign IC member services. 
After the completion of the transformation, the system 
had to be restructured in line with new goals and tasks, and 
fully aligned with similar systems that existed in the Western 
democracies. After the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian 
Danube region ended, Croatian IC shifted towards new, 
peaceful activities and organisation, towards new goals and 
objectives. 
The change of the government in 2000, the new six-
party ruling coalition, started the processes that caused 
instability and collapse of the national security system. For 
international partners’ Croatian intelligence service became 
insufficiently effective and volatile partner, due to the fact 
that primary users were insufficiently aware of the role that 
the IC has in modern democratic states. The six-party 
coalition agreed a "division" of the IC according to the party 
interests, which led to numerous leaks of most heavily 
guarded documents in public, with the aim of gaining 
personal and party political interests. There was a change in 
the internal and external policies that reflected the work of 
the IC. The primary users were not able to establish 
priorities, short- and long-term objectives and tasks of the IC 
member services, because Croatia, as a state, after year 
2000 had no precisely defined strategic goals. It turned out 
that those actions created numerous problems to the 
national security system and, among others, led to a rapid 
shift of the ruling administration, in the next elections. 
The problems that can still be seen in the work of 
Croatian IC are in fact that Croatia has the National Security 
Strategy, adopted in March 2002, 12 years ago. This 
strategy is obsolete in almost all its parts, especially in the 
part where is written that the Republic of Croatia needs to 
become a member of the Euro-Atlantic Integration (Croatia 
became a member of NATO in early 2009, and joined the 
EU's 1st of July 2013). 
Each IC is a living organism that is organised according 
to the nature and type of challenges that IC is faced with, or 
it might be faced. The organization, structure, objectives and 
tasks of individual IC depends on a number of historical, 
political, and civilization values and social relations in which 
it is created and operates. It depends on the situation and 
the complexity of international relations and conflicting 
(internal and external) interests. 
In this sense, the imposition of a uniform IC model to the 
different countries is a process that produces long-term 
damages to the real national interests, particularly to the 
























































. societies that are in transition. A return to the system that, by 
its organizational form, has a reminiscent to the system that 
existed in communist systems is not and cannot be a long-
term sustainable solution. 
By comparing the IC that was formed in the Homeland 
war, and the one that exists now, important differences are 
visible. Why the Republic of Croatia then (1990-1992) 
decided to use a model that exists in the NATO member 
states and (primarily the United States) and Israel (as 
today's IC remind to the IC that existed during the former 
Yugoslavia)? Croatia was faced (1990-1992) with numerous 
and serious threats to its survival, such as the problems that 
Israel faces every day for decades. Croatia was faced with a 
very tough and demanding situation and changes in front of 
itself that needed to be done quite fast, primarily to change 
the communist constitution, system and mentality. Likewise, 
the Croatian leadership wanted to show, what they already 
said when they were dissidents during the existence of 
Yugoslavia, that the future of the Republic of Croatia is in the 
Western Europe and NATO, and not in the communist 
and/or Non-aligned organizations. The experiences that 
individual NATO countries had in the process of creating 
their own IC during the Second World War were also one of 
the models for the creation of Croatian IC. 
Croatian IC has had its ups and downs (just like almost 
any other IC) that were/are substantially caused by the 
internal political relations at the Croatian political scene, as 
well as by the external influences of certain influential 
countries in the international community. Croatian IC was 
most effective at the time from 1990 to 1999 when national 
interests and objectives were defined very clearly. The lack 
of a clear vision about the role, position and importance of IC 
in processes to identify, promote and protect national 
interests negatively affects the IC. Weak and ineffective IC 
presents a problem for the international IC because instead 
of facing the challenges, it becomes a problem that 
dissipates people, resources, and valuable time in time of 
crisis. 
At the end, we have to say that there is not such a thing 
like perfectly organized intelligence community that certain 
bad personal solutions can damage. Also badly organized IC 
can be launched toward positive side of organizational forms 
that will allow more democratic and better results, if at the 
key positions are appointed persons that are able to neglect 
their personal interests over the interests of the state.  
That is the necessary determination of state leaders who 
have to know what they want from IC, without violation of 




































. human rights of the individual and the community, except 
under strictly defined procedures and in a clearly defined 
situations. Reaching the general, social and political, 
consensus about key national interests is one of the 
cornerstones of the success of the state and the society. 
States, where the core standards change with each change 
of party in power (especially in the coalition governments 
with numerous members) are “sentenced to” constant crisis, 
and therefore are subject to numerous risks (economic, 
social, security, cultural ....). Therefore, an important 
responsibility for the successful operation of each IC 
depends on both the ruling and opposition politicians, who 
should be aware of the problems that the politicization of IC 
brings huge problems in the short and long term. 
Precisely democratic procedure as well as already 
mentioned consensus of major political parties will safeguard 
the integrity of the IC, its continued successful activities. IC 
is one of the systems that cannot produce, rapidly, high 
quality results without the certain risk level. Therefore, the 
continuity in the area of professional personnel, as well as in 
the goals and objectives in accordance with clearly, and 
unequivocally, established national (and international) 












Croatian (and some Serbian*) English 
Used Abb Full name Full name 
























































. B&H Bosna i Hercegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina 




CK SKJ Centralni Komitet Saveza 
Komunista Jugoslavije 
Central Committee of League of 
Communist of Yugoslavia 
DDR Njemačka Demokratska 
Republika 
German Democratic Republic 
DKP Diplomatsko-konzularna 
predstavništva 
Diplomatic and Consular 
Missions 
GS HV Glavni Stožer Hrvatske Vojske Croatian Army Headquarter 
GŠ JNA* Generalštab Jugoslavenske 
Narodne Armije 
Yugoslav People’s Army 
Headquarter 
HDZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Croatian democratic union 
HIS Hrvatska izvještajna služba Croatian Intelligence Service 
IC Obavještajna zajednica Intelligence Community 
KOG* Kontraobaveštajna grupa Counterintelligence group 
KNOJ Korpus narodne obrane 
Jugoslavije 
People's Defence Corps of 
Yugoslavia 





ONO i DSZ* 
Komitet za opće-narodnu odbranu 
i društvenu samozaštitu 
Committee GPD&SPS – 
Committee for General People’s 
Defence and Selfprotection of 
Society 
KOS* Kontraobaveštajna služba Military Counterintelligence 
Service 
MO Ministarstvo obrane Ministry of Defence 
MUP Ministarstvo Unutarnjih Poslova Ministry of Internal Affairs 





































NKVD Narodno ministarstvo unutarnjih 
poslova Sovjetskog Saveza 
People's Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs (from 1934-1946 
in Soviet union) 
NS Nadzorna Služba Control and Supervision 
Service 
NSEI Nacionalna Služba Elektroničkog 
Izviđanja 
Croatian National Sigint Service 
OA Obavještajna Agencija Intelligence Agency 
ObAk Obavještajna Akademija Intelligence Academy 
ObU Obavještajna Uprava Directorate of Intelligence 
Affairs (within the Croatian 
Army Headquarters) 
OOPZ Odjel za Obrambene Pripreme 
Zemlje 
Sub department for defence 
preparations of the country 
(Stay Behind Network) 
OTC Operativno-tehnički centar za 
nadzor telekomunikacija 
Operational-Technical Centre 
for the Surveillance of 
Telecommunications 
OZN* Odelenje zaštite naroda Division for People's Protection 
POA Protuobavještajna Agencija Counter Intelligence Agency 
RF Ruska Federacija Russian Federation 
RH Republika Hrvatska Republic of Croatia 
RI* Radio izviđanje Radio surveillance 
RV I PVO* Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i 
protuvazdušna odbrana 
Air Force and Air Force 
Defence 
SDB* Služba Državne Bezbednosti State Security Service 
(abbreviation for Service that 
existed on Federal level and in 
Serbia) 
SDS Služba Državne Sigurnosti State Security Service 
























































. (abbreviation for Service that 
existed in Croatia) 
SEE Jugoistočna Europa South-eastern Europe 
SFRJ Socijalistička Federativna 
Republika Jugoslavija 




Služba za Istraživanje i 
Dokumentaciju Saveznog 
sekretarijata za inostrane poslove 
Investigation and 
Documentation Service of 
Federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
SIS Sigurnosno-informativna služba Security Intelligence Service (in 
Ministry of Defence) 
SO Stožer Osiguranja Security Headquarter 
SOA Sigurnosno Obavještajna 
Agencija 
Security and Intelligence 
Agency 
SONS Stožerni Odbor za Nacionalnu 
Sigurnost 
Joint National Security 
Committee 
SSIP* Savezni Sekretarijat Inostranih 
Poslova 
Federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
SSNO* Savezni Sekretarijat Narodne 
Odbrane 
Federal Ministry of Defence 
SSSR Savez Sovjetskih Socijalističkih 
Republika 
United Soviet Socialist 
Republics 
SSUP* Savezni Sekretarijat Unutrašnjih 
Poslova 
Federal Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 
SUBNOR Savez udruženja boraca Narodno 
oslobodilačkog rata 
Union of the associations of the 
People’s liberation war veterans 
(communist organisation) 
SZUP Služba za Zaštitu Ustavnog 
Poretka 




Territorial surveillance and 
intelligence organisation 





































TO Teritorijalna obrana Territorial defence 
UB* Uprava Bezbednosti Military Counterintelligence 
Department 
UDB* Uprava Državne Bezbednosti State Security Department 
UNS Ured za Nacionalnu Sigurnost National Security Office 
USKOK Ured za Suzbijanje Korupcije i 
Organiziranog Kriminaliteta 
Bureau for Combating 
Corruption and Organized 
Crime 
UVNS Ured Vijeća za Nacionalnu 
Sigurnost 
Office of the National Security 
Council 
UZUP Ured za Zaštitu Ustavnog Poretka Office for the Protection of the 
Constitutional Order 
VNS Vijeće za Nacionalnu Sigurnost National Security Council 






Military Intelligence Service of 
Yugoslav People’s Army 
Headquarter 
VPO* Vojno-Pomorska Oblast Military Maritime (Naval) District 
VSA Vojna Sigurnosna Agencija Military Security Agency 
VSOA Vojna Sigurnosno Obavještajna 
Agencija 
Military Security and 
Intelligence Agency 
VŠ NOP i 
DVJ 
Vrhovni štab narodno-
oslobodilačkog pokreta i 
dobrovoljačke vojske Jugoslavije 
Supreme Headquarter of 
National Liberation Movement 
and Volunteer Army of 
Yugoslavia 
VŠ NOV i 
POJ 
Vrhovni štab narodno-
oslobodilačkog pokreta i 
partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije. 
Supreme Headquarter of 
National Liberation Movement 
and Partisan Detachments of 
Yugoslavia 
WP Zemlje članice Varšavskog bloka Warsaw Pact or Warsaw Treaty 
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